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µDecolonisation¶ in China, 1949-1959 
 
Jonathan J. Howlett 
 
While historians of empire have embraced the differences in the forms, natures and fates of 
imperialisms across the world in the last several decades, China remains largely peripheral to 
models largely focused on India, the Dominions and Africa. This is perhaps because China 
was never a formal colony and also because it is often considered to be exceptional. Yet, as 
the other chapters in this volume demonstrate, China was connected to the networks of the 
imperial world and was itself a site of imperial competition and interaction. %ULWDLQ¶V
relationship with China was far more complicated than can be allowed for under models that 
posit simplistic state-to-state relations. This chapter explores the ending of that particular 
relationship after the Communist revolution of 1949, approaching it as a process of 
µGHFRORQLVDWLRQ¶DIIHFWHGE\DPXOWLSOLFLW\RIVWDWHDQGQRQ-state actors. 
 
The literature on decolonisation has also largely neglected China, except perhaps when 
establishing the context for events elsewhere (such as in Malaya and Singapore). When it has 
been studied, decolonisation in China seems to have followed a rather neat narrative: the 
processes surrounding the abrogation of extraterritoriality and the normalisation of Sino-
foreign relations in the Republican period (1911-49) have, for example, been well covered.1 
There were, however, always two spheres of Sino-British interaction: one at the level of 
treaties, trade and diplomacy, and the other on the ground level within China.2 If we consider 
decolonisation to be more than a matter of high-level diplomacy and define it instead as 
implying the removal of outside influences from a country, it is clear that when the Chinese 
Communist Party took power in 1949, much remained to be done. 
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Such a flexible definition of decolonisation is not new: in recent decades decolonisation has 
been explored in all its variety and confusion and in a profusion of local contexts. Historians 
have long acknowledged that decolonisation is a historical process defined more by exception 
than by rule.3 +LVWRULHVRIGHFRORQLVDWLRQKDYHµVKLIWHG6RXWK¶DORQJZLWKVFKRODUVKLSRQWKH
Cold War: placing increasing emphasis on the agency of post-colonial states in Asia, Africa 
and Latin America.4 *RVFKDDQG2VWHUPDQQ¶VYROXPHConnected Histories is an excellent 
example of recent work in this areaµFRQQHFWLQJ¶previously separate histories of 
decolonisation and the Cold War in Asia.5 Among the contributors to Connected Histories 
ZDV&KHQ-LDQZKRVHFKDSWHUH[SORUHG&KLQD¶VVWDQFHDVDQLPSRUWDQWFKDPSLRQRIDQWL-
imperialism in the 1950s and its role at the Bandung Conference as well as in conflicts in 
Korea, Malaya and elsewhere.6 What Chen neglected was the fact that for the CCP, 
imperialism within China was not a thing of the past. The idea, first advanced by Mao 
=HGRQJLQ2FWREHUWKDWXQGHUWKH&&3&KLQDKDGµVWRRGXS¶DQGH[SHOOHGWKHIRUFHVRI
imperialism seems to have been widely accepted both in and outside of China, but in fact the 
CCP struggled to eliminate foreign, especially British, influences from within China 
throughout the 1950s.7 
 
The early years of Communist rule have been re-conceptualized by historians over the past 
two decades and it is vital, as Kirby has observed, that international and comparative 
elements are not forgotten.8 New insights can be gained through deploying concepts and 
comparisons from wider literatures on decolonisation. While recognising that the Chinese 
developed many pragmatic and original strategies, this chapter will also suggest that in its 
moment of transformation, China was not necessarily exceptional. Across the world, the 
1937-45 conflict triggered a violent reordering of international relations and relations 
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between governments and their populations. This era was defined by the parallel (and 
sometimes linked) processes of the accelerated decline of the Europe-centred order through 
decolonisation and the emergence of a new socialist world led by the Soviet Union.9 China 
sat at the confluence of these two movements, facing state-building challenges familiar to the 
governments of new and reconstructing states across the world.  
  
'(&2/21,6,1*$µ6(0,-&2/21<¶ 
 
The nature of the British presence in China has long been disputed. Regardless of whether it 
is ODEHOOHGµVHPL-FRORQLDOLVP¶RUµLQIRUPDOHPSLUH¶LWFHUWDLQO\shared many of the 
characteristics of imperialism, including territorial enclaves, extraterritoriality and 
intervention in the domestic and foreign policy of the colonized.10 Osterhammel has argued 
that this ZDVSULPDULO\DµEXVLQHVVV\VWHP¶SUHGLFDWHGRQWKHLnterlocking interests of 
companies and states.11 Such a definition is useful, but it also obscures the great variety of 
foreign influences in China that bore testimony to its complicated position within global 
networks of empire, war and migration: as this volume has shown, Britons and other 
foreigners went to China for a variety of reasons and interacted with Chinese people in a 
myriad of ways. In November 1950 the CCP counted a total of 11,939 foreigners in Shanghai 
alone, belonging to around forty different nationalities. Among them ZHUHµ%ULWLVK¶
people (many of whom were from the wider empire), constituting the largest national group 
from a Western country.12  
 
Regardless of how historians define British and other foreign influences, Chinese nationalists 
were certainly convinced that their country had been subjected to imperialist aggression.13 By 
the time of his death in 1925, Sun Yat-sen, the revolutionary acclaimed by the CCP as the 
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µIRUHUXQQHU¶RIWKHLUUHYROXWLRQKDGFRPHWRVHH anti-imperialism as a prerequisite for 
national renewal.14 As soon as 6XQ¶VSDUW\WKH*XRPLQGDQJFDPHWRSRZHULQWKH\KDG
begun campaigning for the normalisation of Sino-foreign relations. In response, British 
diplomats carried out a protracted, negotiated surrender of their privileges (the trappings of 
µLPSHULDOLVP¶in order to preserve business interests. This retreat was not uncontested by 
business and settler groups.15 This was one example of a familiar pattern, followed across 
formal and informal empire, though as White has observed, the relationship between business 
and policy-PDNHUVZDVQRWDOZD\VDQXQFRPSOLFDWHGµJHQWOHPDQO\-FDSLWDOLVW¶SDUWQHUship and 
after 1945 Cold War concerns often overrode economic considerations.16 
 
By the early 1930s sovereignty had been regained over almost two thirds of the foreign 
concessions and control was reasserted RYHU&KLQD¶VFXVWRPVVDOWDQGSRVWDODGPLQLVWUDWLRQV
The Shanghai International Settlement was occupied by the Japanese in 1941 and in 1943 the 
British and Americans negotiated its return to Chinese sovereignty and the abrogation of all 
their remaining treaty privileges including extraterritoriality.17 By 1949 the Guomindang had 
undone much of the legal and political framework underpinning foreign imperialism, but 
their achievements were downplayed by the CCP who portrayed them as compromised 
collaborators.18  
 
While the formal bases of imperialism were undermined, informal influences were still 
apparent in 1949. Despite the departure of large numbers of foreigners before the CCP 
takeover, China remained home to extensive networks of foreign businesses, diplomats and 
missionaries. The CCP saw the final elimination of the foreign presence as a vital precursor 
to securing the independence RIµ1HZ&KLQD¶19 0DRIDPRXVO\GHFODUHGWKDWWKHµELJKRXVH¶
WKDWZDV&KLQDKDGEHHQPDGHµWRRGLUW\WRRFKDRWLFE\:HVWHUQLPSHULDOLVP¶DQGWKDWRQO\
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µDIWHUWKHKRXVHKDVEHHQVZHSWFOHDQ¶FRXOGWKH&&3µLQYLWHLQJXHVWV¶ In linkiQJ&KLQD¶V
independence to the need to eliminate foreign interests, especially commercial interests, Mao 
was foreshadowing international debates about neo-colonialism which rose to prominence in 
the 1950s and 1960s (though he not the first to do so).20 While there have been studies on 
KRZWKHKRXVHZDVµVZHSW¶DIWHU this process has not yet been approached as 
µGHFRORQLVDWLRQ¶21  
 
5RELQ:LQNVKDVDUJXHGWKDWWKHGHFRORQLVDWLRQRIµLQIRUPDOHPSLUH¶ZDVDPHVVLHUSURFHVV
WKDQWKDWRIµIRUPDOHPSLUH¶KH TXRWHVD0H[LFDQSURYHUEZKLFKVD\VWKDWWRGLYRUFHRQH¶V
spouse is a matter of simple law, but to divorce a lover is impossible. In formal empire, he 
argues, indigenous elites could be groomed, handovers could be delayed and in the end the 
birth of a new QDWLRQRIIHUHGDIUHVKVWDUW7KHµLQWHUQDOSDUWQHUV¶RILQIRUPDOHPSLUHRQWKH
other hand, were left in limbo and colonial legacies were incompletely purged.22 We should, 
of course, be wary of presenting the decolonisation of any part of the world as a formality, it 
ZDVDFRPSOH[DQGRIWHQYLROHQWSURFHVVEXW:LQNV¶TXHVWLRQUHPDLQVYDOLGKRZdid the 
&KLQHVHWKHµLQWHUQDOSDUWQHU¶ here, approach the elimination of the legacies of semi-
colonialism after 1949?        
 
ECONOMIC DECOLONISATION 
 
In January 6WDOLQ¶VDGYLVRULQ%HLMLQJVXJJHVWHGWKDWWKH&KLQHVHVKRXOGQDWLRQDOL]HDOO
foreign property except for American assets, as only the Americans were capable of 
retaliation. The CCP had first decided on a policy of nationalisation in 1928, but now Mao 
replied that they would have to move slowly because foreign capital was so closely 
intertwined with the domestic economy.23 )RUHLJQILUPVGRPLQDWHG&KLQD¶VEDQNLQJ
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insurance, real estate, public utilities and shipping, amongst other important sectors. In a later 
conversation, Mao told 6WDOLQ¶VHQYR\WKDWµLQorder to destroy the enemy, one should grow 
VWURQJHFRQRPLFDOO\¶DQGWKLVPHDQWDYRLGLQJULVNV24 &KLQD¶VHFRQRP\KDGVXIIHUHGJUHDWO\
during the Sino-Japanese War (1937-45) and a series of economic crises between 1945 and 
1949 had contributed to the collapse of the Guomindang by degrading their ability to make 
war and eroding their credibility as an effective government.25 The CCP leadership saw that 
the economy needed thorough reconstruction: employment and economic security were 
paramount, but how could this be achieved alongside the elimination of foreign companies? 
  
In hindsight, the British withdrawal from China appears to be a logical consequence of post-
war decline, yet this was not apparent at the time.26 Britain remained influential on the world 
VWDJHLWZDV$PHULFD¶VFKLHIDOO\LWZDVDIRXQGHUPHPEHURIWKH8QLWHG1DWLRQV6HFXULW\
&RXQFLODQGLWVWLOOSRVVHVVHGRQHRIWKHZRUOG¶VODUJHVWHFRQRPLHV27 Britons in China desired 
to maintain a trading presence and it was widely believed that the Communist government 
would require their services in order to access world markets.28 In 1949 there were 1,104 
foreign enterprises in China. Although the Americans represented gloEDO&RPPXQLVP¶VJUHDW
nemesis, the British remained more significant on the ground: around 35 per cent of all 
foreign businesses in China were British-owned and British interests accounted for 68 per 
cent of the total capital invested.29 When American diplomatic personnel were withdrawn in 
early 1950 and US assets were frozen in December that year, the British were the most 
significant foreign contingent remaining.30  
 
&KLQD¶VSROLF\WRZDUGVIRUHLJQEXVLQHVVHVLQWKHVZDVVKDSHGE\WKUHHPDLQIDFWRrs: 
domestic trends in the nationalisation and socialisation of the economy; the need to ensure 
HFRQRPLFVWDELOLW\DQGWKHGHVLUHWRDYRLGµQHR-FRORQLDO¶GHSHQGHQFH$WILUVWIRUHLJQILUPV
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like their Chinese counterparts, were offered protection under tKHEDQQHURIµ1HZ
'HPRFUDF\¶xin minzhuzhuyi), an interim period of moderation designed to lay the 
groundwork for a later transition to socialism. Private business was allowed to profit as long 
DVFDSLWDOLVWVZRUNHGLQWKHµQDWLRQDOLQWHUHVW¶, while strategically vital companies were 
brought under state control.31 Regardless of their nationality, all companies struggled under 
WKHSUHVVXUHRIGHIODWLRQDU\PHDVXUHVKLJKWD[HVDQGWKH*XRPLQGDQJ¶VHFRQRPLFEORFNDGH, 
which affected access to materials and markets. Between 1950 and 1952 foreign businesses 
were weakened using administrative measures, such as punitive taxation, as well as pressure 
from workforces, to extract capital and increase liabilities, but this did not yet amount to a 
plan for nationalisation.32 To prevent a mass withdrawal, foreign firms were not allowed to 
GLVSRVHRIWKHLUDVVHWVWKURXJKVDOHRUFORVXUHXQOHVVWKH\ILUVWREWDLQHGWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶V
approval. Approval was seldom forthcoming as the government feared unemployment and 
harmful effects on production. 33 Foreign managers were denied exit permits until their 
FRPSDQLHV¶DIIDLUVZHUHVHWWOHGa policy that has becoPHNQRZQDVµKRVWDJHFDSLWDOLVP¶34  
 
The short-term impetus for the purging of foreign businesses came with the socialist 
transformation of the Chinese economy. Historians have long seen the New Democratic 
policy as little more than a rhetorical device used to veil the CCP's true intentions. Bennis 
Wai-yip So has argued that in the economic sphere at least there was no hidden agenda to 
eliminate the private sector before 1953. The Communists, he argues, were initially reluctant 
even to form state-private joint enterprises, for fear of alarming capitalists who might see this 
as a step towards nationalisation. Such enterprises were only created when the company had 
previously been part-owned by capitalists who had fled, or to safeguard crucial companies. 
The CCP did, however, conceive of capitalism as being a chaotic phenomenon that was 
unsuited to the creation of a stable economy and so they regulated it through central 
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planning.35 The private sector gradually recovered and capitalists made profits: production in 
1951 was 60 per cent higher than in 1949.36 The problem, So argues, was that because the 
CCP placed strict controls over the supply of raw materials and the purchase of finished 
products private factories essentially became state contractors. Attempts to develop the 
private sector failed under the state-controlled system.37 The elimination of the Chinese 
private sector necessitated an accelerated removal of foreign companies. 
 
The Chinese were not alone in going down the path of nationalisation to speed post-war 
reconstruction: after the Second World War there was a global shift towards state 
intervention and planned economies, even in capitalist states like Britain and France, in order 
to provide basic guarantees of work, welfare and stability. For many Communist and 
nationalist parties across the world (especially those with bad memories of dealing with 
Western businesses), the Soviet model of fast industrial growth under the aegis of a strong 
Party-state based on egalitarian values was very appealing.38 7KH6RYLHW8QLRQ¶VHFRQRPLF
and technological lead was followed in a diverse range of countries, with Soviet experts 
guiding the process (some invited, others imposed).39 Many states in transition towards 
Communism had periods of New Democracy in common and there are strong parallels (yet to 
be thoroughly explored), between the China after 1949 and the Central and Eastern European 
Communist states after 1945. Between 1945 and 1949, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, 
East Germany, Poland, Yugoslavia and Romania all nationalized large sectors of their 
economies. The majority of foreign companies in these countries were expropriated (with or 
without compensation).40  
 
In China, very few foreign businesses were expropriated, with the major exceptions being a 
few strategically important companies, including the public utilities in Shanghai.41 Rather, the 
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Chinese decideGLQWRDGDSWWKHLUµSROLF\RIVTXHH]H¶SUHYLRXVO\XVHGWRKHDSOLDELOLWLHV
on foreign companies, to engineer their exit on favourable terms, controlling the pace of 
closure to prevent disruption.42 In late August 1951 the Yee Tsoong Tobacco Company had 
set a precedent for the closure of all large foreign companies by offering the Chinese 
government all of its assets in exchange for its liabilities and permission to close.43 A Foreign 
2IILFHREVHUYHUGHVFULEHGWKHLUµVWRFNSDWWHUQ¶ 
 
Their aim is to make a firm give up its property by its own act, so that no claim can lie 
against the Chinese Government for restitution or compensation. Their method is to 
make the firm totally insolvent by denying it the possibility of continuing its business, 
by multiplying its liabilities and by refusing it permission to meet these liabilities by 
sale of property & stock. The means used are unfair and very effective.  
 
This policy was not directed explicitly against British firms: it was simply the case that the 
majority of those remaining were British.44 These practices were, according to another 
)RUHLJQ2IILFHVSHFLDOLVWµVWDQGDUGSUDFWLFHWKURXJKRXWWKH6RYLHWRUELW¶45 The number of 
British firms in Shanghai declined from 376 in May 1949 to 25 in 1954.46 It is difficult to 
assign a value for lost British assets: A commonly quoted (unofficial) estimate of their 1949 
value was £300 million.47 Some British firms moved faster to shed their liabilities than 
RWKHUVFKDUJpG¶DIIDLUHV+XPSKUH\7UHYHO\DQQRWHGWKDW-DUGLQH Matheson & Co., for 
H[DPSOHKDGPDGHµFRQFHVVLRQDIWHUFRQFHVVLRQ¶LQWKHLUKDVWH48 They were keen to shed 
their unprofitable fixed assets and shift to a new pattern of trade via Hong Kong.  
  
µ6XUUHQGHU¶RQWKH<HH7VRRQJPRGHOZDVVHHQE\WKH)RUHLJQOffice as having potentially 
disastrous international implications. At this time, China was not necessarily priority: but 
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policymakers were more concerned with the situation in Iran.49 After the nationalisation of 
the strategically important Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1951 the British and the Iranians 
ZHUHORFNHGLQDVWDQGRIIRYHUWKHRZQHUVKLSRIWKHZRUOG¶VODUJHVWUHILQHU\DW$EDGDQXQWLO
1953 when the nationalist premier was replaced with the pro-Western Shah in a FRXSG¶pWDW. 
Events in China were one part of a worrying trend: as %ULWDLQ¶Vmilitary and political prestige 
declined, so did WKHFRXQWU\¶V ability to secure the former spheres of influence in which 
commerce was conducted. 7KLVQRGRXEWLQIRUPHGWKH)RUHLJQ2IILFH¶VGHFLVLRQQRWWR
support a wholesale withdrawal of British firms from China.50  
 
The decolonisation of any country poses an economic challenge: there must be either a 
withdrawal of foreign businesses, which creates a vacuum, or the continuance of existing 
commercial businesses, which carries the risk of neo-colonial economic dominance.51 In 
6RXWKHDVW$VLDIRUH[DPSOHWKH3DFLILF:DUKDGGHYDVWDWHGWKHHFRQRPLHVRIWKHUHJLRQ¶V
emerging nations, like China, these states wanted to reconstruct and develop their economies. 
Most used state-directed central plans to do so.52 As Lindblad has observed, they all faced the 
same dilemma: all sought to reduce their reliance on colonial trading networks and develop 
indigenous industry through import substitution and industrialisation, as had been tried in 
China as early as the 1930s, but such restructuring required huge amounts of capital. 
Financial hierarchies replaced colonial ones. The Philippines offered a prime example of the 
GDQJHUVRIµQHR-FRORQLDOLVP¶DIWHULQGHSHQGHQFHLQWKHLUeconomy remained 
dominated by American companies.53 Malaysia found it similarly difficult to break away 
from British trading networks.54 'HVSLWHWKHLUSUDJPDWLFJUDGXDOLVPWKH&&3¶VDLPZDVWR
eliminate Western economic influences thoroughly and secure true economic independence. 
China was quite effective in severing its old ties of dependency, making use of foreign 
trading companies when needed, as agents of the state trading monopolies, while promoting 
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self-reliance and trade with other socialist states. &KLQD¶VSROLF\ZDV echoed LQ6XNDUQR¶V 
Indonesia. $IWHU,QGRQHVLD¶VLQGHSHQGHQFHLQ%ULWLVKDQG$PHULFDQVKLSSLQJEDQNLQJ
and manufacturing companies, many of which had also operated in China, continued to 
dominate large sectors of the Indonesian economy. In the late 1950s and early 1960s they 
FDPHXQGHUSUHVVXUHIURPQDWLRQDOLVWHFRQRPLFSROLFLHVXQGHUµ6RVLDOLVPH,QGRQHVLD¶
before eventually being nationalized (albeit temporarily) in 1963-65.55  
 
CULTURAL DECOLONISATION IN SHANGHAI 
 
Just as economic independence was crucial to any decolonising state, so was the removal of 
foreign influence in the cultural sphere and its replacement with indigenous (traditional or 
invented) practices and culture. In China, this was particularly important in thHQDWLRQ¶V
largest and most commercially developed city, Shanghai. The city was described in CCP 
SURSDJDQGDDVWKHµ³IRUWUHVVEULGJHKHDG´ RILPSHULDOLVWDJJUHVVLRQDJDLQVW&KLQD¶56 May 
PDUNHGWKHELUWKRIµ1HZ6KDQJKDL¶DQG µ2OG6KDQJKDL¶ZDVYLOLILHd.57 As imperialism 
was believed to have permeated all aspects of city life, corrupting and degrading its citizens, 
a thorough re-RUGHULQJRI6KDQJKDL¶VSROLWLFVHFRQRPLFVDQGFXOWXUHZDVQHHGHG$IHZ
DVSHFWVRIWKH&&3¶VWUDQVIRUPDWLYHefforts are discussed below. A desire to reform Shanghai 
was not new: the Guomindang had seen civic and national renewal and anti-imperialism as 
being inextricably linked.58 
 
Mass political campaigns were a commonly used tool for inducing social change in the early 
period of Communist rule, they differed in form and function, but here we shall briefly 
examine the impact of the Campaign to Resist America and Aid Korea on the cultural 
transformation of Shanghai. With their ability to penetrate all levels of society and to 
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politicize daily life, campaigns were extremely effective tools for social engineering.59 The 
nation-wide Campaign to Resist America and Aid Korea began in late 1950, its practical aim 
being to support the efforts of the Chinese armies in Korea through production drives, fund-
raising and other economic measures. It was also intended to educate Chinese citizens on the 
dangers of imperialism and to encourage them to sever any remaining emotional ties to the 
West.60 The Campaign DWWDFNHGERWKµKDUG¶WDUJHWVVXFKDVFXOWXUDOHGXFDWLRQDOUHOLJLRXV
DQGFKDULWDEOHRUJDQLVDWLRQVDQGµVRIW¶WDUJHWVLQFRQVXPHUFXOWXUHDQGGDLO\OLIH$V6KDQJKDL
waVERWK&KLQD¶VPRVWLQGXVWULDOL]ed and most foreign influenced city, the campaign was 
carried out particularly thoroughly there.61  
 
7KHHOLPLQDWLRQRIµLPSHULDOLVWSURSDJDQGDRUJDQV¶ZDVVHHQDVDFUXFLDOVWHSMao had noted 
in December 1949 that the British predominated in commerce, while the Americans 
dominated the cultural sphere, especially in missionary associations.62 The outbreak of the 
Korean War accelerated the process, especially because the freezing of American assets 
meant that the majority of foreign-subsidized organisations were in dire economic 
circumstances. In early 1951 the State Council announced measures for dealing with foreign-
subsidized organisations, including schools, hospitals and churches. Through µUHJLVWUDWLRQ¶
the CCP exerted control over foreign-run and foreign-subsidized organisations, restricting 
their actions and turning them into private or state-run Chinese organisations.63  A total of 
666 organisations were registered and among these 545 received foreign funds. Of this 
number, 121 were actually managed by foreigners; 263 relied on US funds; and 32 on British. 
The majority were closed or made into Chinese-run organisations later that year.64   
 
Attempts were also made to remove more indirect foreign cultural influences from everyday 
life. For example, Shanghai was famous for its many cinemas which had brought Hollywood 
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(and Pinewood) fashions and culture an avid movie-going public.65 Foreign films were not 
immediately cracked down upon and in fact they continued to draw large audiences: the 
Shanghai Culture Bureau reported that 646 British and American films were shown to 
14,505,773 people between April 1949 and November 1950.66 The CCP were anxious to 
SURYLGHDQDOWHUQDWLYHWRWKHVHµLPPRUDO¶ILOPVDnd so new regulations emerged in April 
VWDWLQJWKDWDWOHDVWDTXDUWHURIHDFKFLQHPD¶VPRQWKO\SURJUDPPHKDGWREHGHYRWHGWR
&KLQHVHRU6RYLHWµSURJUHVVLYHILOPV¶DQGWKHDGYHUWLVLQJRIIRUHLJQIHDWXUHVZDVFDUHIXOO\
restricted.67 That same month, the CCP strengthened control over the Chinese film industry, 
making it clear to all concerned that cinema was no longer simply about business or art, but 
rather a highly politicized medium, subject to strict ideological censorship. In July, an 
advisory committee was established to police the industry.68 New Chinese films were moral 
LQWRQHRQH%HLMLQJVKRSZRUNHUZDVUHSRUWHGDVVD\LQJµ1RZDGD\VILOPVWHDFKSHRSOHKRZ
to be good persons. They are not like the old pictures that dealt with crime and the 
extrDYDJDQWOLYLQJRIULFKSHRSOHDQGIRUHLJQHUV¶69 An advertisement for the Sino-Soviet 
FROODERUDWLYHHIIRUWµ&KLQHVH3HRSOH¶V9LFWRU\¶LQ2FWREHUDQQRXQFHGLWWREHµWKHILUVW
picture of a high artistic standard and a political and educational significance that ever 
DSSHDUVRQWKHVFUHHQ¶70    
 
7KH&&3¶V(QJOLVK-language newspaper The Shanghai News pointed out to its readers in 
June 1950 that: where once the listings pages were overrun with Betty Grables and Errol 
Flynns, now Chinese movie-goers were flocking to see Chinese and Soviet pictures. They 
reported that admissions to American and British films had fallen from 46.9 per cent of the 
total in November 1949 to 28 per cent in May 1950. This change was not brought about 
through coercion, they maintaiQHGµEXWE\SHQHWUDWLRQWKURXJKVWXG\JURXSVDQGSROLWLFDO
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DZDNHQLQJRQWKHSDUWRIWKHSHRSOHWKHPVHOYHVµ$OOWKLVJRHVWRLQGLFDWH¶WKHDUWLFOH
continued, 
 
that even the sub-colonial urbanites in Shanghai have undergone a thorough 
overhauling, that they have forsaken Hollywood and all that goes with it, its make-
beliefs, its compradore culture, and what not.71   
 
The Shanghai authorities capitalized on the momentum of the Campaign to Resist America 
and Aid Korea to purge foreign films, making their prohibition seem as though it came in 
response to popular demands. 6KDQJKDL¶V young people's µKRVWLOLW\WRZDUGV$PHULFDQ
LPSHULDOLVPKDGEHHQDZDNHQHG¶VDLGWKH&XOWXUDO%XUHDXDVLWVHQWSURSDJDQGDWHDPVWR
VSHDNDWPDVVPHHWLQJVRQWKHQHHGWRµOLTXLGDWH¶WKHµSRLVRQRXVLGHRORJ\¶RIFXOWXUDO
imperialism. By December, Western films had been banned. 72  
 
Spatial reordering and the politicisation of the lived environment were seen as integral to 
UHVKDSLQJVRFLHW\$WWKLVWLPHQHZµVRFLDOLVWVSDFHV¶ZHUHFUHDWHGWKURXJKRXWWKH&RPPXQLVW
world and old spaces were assigned new meanings and functions.73 In Shanghai, some sites 
RIµLPSHULDOLVWLQIOXHQFH¶ZHUHGHPROLVKHG while others, like the Bund, were occupied. In 
IRUH[DPSOHLWZDVDQQRXQFHGWKDWWKHVLWHRIWKHFLW\¶VQLQHW\-year-old racecourse 
ZRXOGEHWDNHQRYHUWREXLOGDKXJHµ3HRSOH¶V6TXDUH¶ZKLFKZDVWREHDFHQWUHIRU
UHYROXWLRQDU\DFWLYLW\7KHUDFHFRXUVHWKH&&3VDLGKDGEHHQHVWDEOLVKHGE\µ%ULWLVK
LPSHULDOLVWJROGGLJJHUV¶WRFRUUXSWWKHFLW\¶VFLWL]HQVLWKDGEDQNUXSWHGWKH&KLQHVHSHRSOH
morally and financially.74 At the ground-breaking ceremony vice-Mayor Pan Hannian 
declared that this was a symbolic moment in the process of reclaiming Shanghai: 
 
  
15 
 
Everyone knows that this ground has been branded with the indelible mark of the big 
SRZHUV¶DJJUHVVLRQDJDLQVW&KLQD«WKLVSLHFHRf land which has been occupied by the 
LPSHULDOLVWVIRURYHU\HDUVKDVUHWXUQHGWRWKHHPEUDFHRIWKHSHRSOHRI6KDQJKDL«
it is to be used by the people of Shanghai!75 
 
6KDQJKDL¶VQHZPXQLFLSDOVLWHVWHQGHGWREHLQODQGDZD\IURPWKHULYHUVLGH%XQGUHIlecting 
SHUKDSVWKHFLW\¶VVKLIWLQJUROHIURPDQRXWZDUG-looking trading city to a city that served the 
Chinese revolution, atoning for its past indulgences. This was a pattern reflected in other 
Asian port cities, including Rangoon.76  
 
HUMAN LEGACIES 
 
IQWKHODWHVPDQ\6KDQJKDL\RXWKVKDGFRPHWRGHILQHWKHPVHOYHVDVµOLWWOHDHURSODQHV¶
(xiao feiji). These youths were the Chinese equivalent of American bobby-soxers: teens 
known for their wild jazz dancing. These free-spirited youths wore knitted sweaters inscribed 
ZLWKSKUDVHVVXFKDVµ,/RYH<RX¶%\-DQXDU\WKH\KDGEHHQPDGHWKHWDUJHWRIDSUHVV
campaign accusing them of immorality, robbery and rape.77 They were an example of one of 
the least well studied legacies of the spread of Anglophone culture in China: its adoption by 
PLGGOHDQGXSSHUFODVVHOLWHV7KURXJKRXW6KDQJKDL¶VKLVWRU\IRUHLJQHUVKDGUHOLHGRQWKH
cooperation of English-speaking Chinese people who occupied a Sino-foreign grey-area in 
ZKLFKWKH\ZRUNHGYDULRXVO\DVµFRPSUDGRU¶ middlemen, cultural influencers and political 
negotiators and lived in close contact with foreign employers, colleagues and friends.78 Many 
attended English speaking colleges and others studied overseas. As nationalism intensified, 
the cultural space they inhabited narrowed and their cosmopolitanism put their authenticity as 
loyal Chinese in doubt. Recent decades have seen an explosion of literature on the fate of the 
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victims of class warfare during the Cultural Revolution, but little remains known about the 
struggles of Westernized men in the early 1950s. This is perhaps because of the difficulty of 
locating source materials: such people can usually only be happened upon from time to time 
in the archive and sometimes in the literature, usually with reference to the fate of capitalists 
or the implementation of campaigns.79  
 
The story of Westernized men in China has parallels in global patterns of decolonisation: 
µ'HFRORQLVDWLRQ¶DUJXHG)UDQW])DQRQµLVWKHYHULWDEOHFUHDWLRQRIQHZPHQ¶DQGWKXVZe 
PLJKWLQIHUWKHGHVWUXFWLRQRIµROGPHQ¶,Q)DQRQ¶VRSLQLRQWKHµQDWLRQDOPLGGOHFODVV¶RI
µXQGHU-GHYHORSHGFRXQWULHV¶KDGEHHQUHPDUNDEOHRQO\EHFDXVHRIWKHLUµVSLULWXDOSHQXU\¶DQG
WKHLUWHQGHQF\WREHVHWLQDµSURIRXQGO\FRVPRSROLWDQPRXOG¶7KH\ were products of 
FRORQLDOLVPµQRWHQJDJHGLQSURGXFWLRQQRULQLQYHQWLRQQRUEXLOGLQJQRUODERXU>WKH\
ZHUH@FRPSOHWHO\FDQDOL]HGLQWRDFWLYLWLHVRIWKHLQWHUPHGLDU\W\SH¶,QWKHH\HVRIWKH
revolutionary they lacked the necessary ambition and skills to build the nation anew and so 
they had to be destroyed in order to prevent neo-colonialism. The CCP would no doubt agree 
ZLWK)DQRQ¶VDVVHUWLRQWKDWWKHµSURRIRIVXFFHVV>RIGHFRORQLVDWLRQ@OLHVLQDZKROHVRFLDO
structure being changed from the bottoPXS¶DQGWKDWWKLVLVµDOZD\VDYLROHQW
SKHQRPHQRQ¶80 
 
The long-established British-China firm Butterfield & Swire were extremely concerned over 
the fate of their senior Chinese staff. Once Swires withdrew, these men would be forced to 
register as unemployed, necessitating a lengthy investigation into their pasts, as well as 
criticism and self-criticism sessions aimed at transforming them into functioning members of 
the new society. Swires told the British Government that they feared that, because of their 
association with foreigners, the Chinese staff would be labelled as counter-revolutionaries or 
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spies. At the very least they would be denied good jobs and the chance to join union-based 
welfare schemes. Writing in 1955, British Consul General Fred Garner disagreed, he 
VXJJHVWHGWKDWWKH\ZRXOGQRWEHµVXEMHFWHGWRDFWXDOSHUVHFXWLRQ¶DVWKHLUVNLOOVZHUHQHHGHG
At worst, they would receive low status jobs. He refused suggestions that the British 
*RYHUQPHQWVKRXOGDSSURDFKWKH&KLQHVHRQWKHPHQ¶VEHKDOIrequesting that they be 
DOORZHGWRJRWR+RQJ.RQJµLPSRVVLEOH¶RUNHSWRQUHWDLQHUVµLWZDVQRW%	6WKDW
VWDUWHGWKHUHYROXWLRQ¶µ:HDOVRKDYHWRUHPHPEHU¶KHFRQFOXGHGµ,WKLQNWKDWWKH
Chinese are great actors and quite expert at adapting themselves to different circumstances. 
7KH\ZRXOGKDYHWROHDUQWKHODQJXDJHRIWKHUHYROXWLRQ¶KHVDLG, quoting the Chinese 
saying³:KHQWKHZLQGEORZVWKHJUDVVEHQGV´81 Garner was over-optimistic: instead men 
and women such as these endured nearly three decades of political attacks and humiliation, 
culminating in outright persecution during the Cultural Revolution.    
 
It is likely that many Westernized, Anglophone people were among those who suffered, were 
demeaned, executed or who committed suicide GXULQJWKH&&3¶VHDUO\FDPSDLJQV,Q$SULO
IRUH[DPSOHRQHRIWKH%ULWLVKWH[WLOHILUP3DWRQV	%DOGZLQV¶VXE-mangers was 
executed along with his whole family in front of a crowd of 15,000 as part of the Campaign 
to Suppress Counter-Revolutionaries. He was one of an estimated 712,000 people executed 
across China, a number determined by quota.82 $FFRUGLQJWR3DWRQV¶PDQDJHUWKHH[HFXWLRQ
KDGEHHQSUHFHGHGE\DOPRVWD\HDURIµIXOOGUHVV¶DWWDFNVµXQGHUWKHJXLVHRISURGXFWLRQ¶
because the man had been identified as a class enemy.83 The Three and Five Antis Campaigns 
(1951-52) saw suicides of capitalists and managers become commonplace in Shanghai and 
elsewhere.84 Suicide was an extreme course, taken by some as the ultimate rejection of the 
new government (but for the CCP it was also the ultimate confession of guilt). The New York 
Times UHSRUWHGWKDWLQ*XDQJ]KRXRQµ%ORRG\$SULO¶, 1952, as many as seventeen 
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shopkeepers, merchants and managers committed suicide. The day apparently culminated in 
an act of public spectacle as the managers of two companies loudly denounced the 
Communists through megaphones from a rooftop before jumping to their deaths.85 Another 
prominent suicide was that of a leading member of the First 1DWLRQDO3HRSOH¶V3ROLWLFDl 
Consultative Committee, Lu Zuofu. Lu was a shipping and industrial magnate from Sichuan 
and he had previously DSSHDUHGWREHWKHDUFKHW\SDOµQDWLRQDOFDSLWDOLVW¶FRRSHUDWLQJXQGHU
µ1HZ'HPRFUDF\¶86 There was, of course, some room for accommodation (the CCP were 
certainly not as fanatical in their millenarian violence as the .KPHU5RXJHZKR¶VHIIRUWVWR
remake Cambodian society between 1975-79 resulted in the deaths of an estimated one to two 
million people, or roughly one third of the population87), but the hardships experienced by 
these men remained the product of the coming to power of a regime that was hostile to their 
class backgrounds, their lifestyles and indeed, their very persons. 
 
One man in a difficult situation was Linson Dzau (Cao Linsheng). Dzau was born to the one 
RI&KLQD¶VULFKHVWIDPLOLHVDQGKDGEHHQHGXFDWHGLQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV88 He represented 
several British and American firms and in late 1949 he was invited to Beijing to discuss 
business by his Tsinghua University fraternity brother Dr. Ji Chaoding, who was now an 
important figure in the Financial and Economic Affairs Committee. Dzau later reported to the 
American Consulate in Shanghai that he had been received cordially, but after ten days of 
interviews, he was delivered to the Political and Legal Affairs Committee, where the 
LQWHUYLHZVEHFDPHµXQIULHQGO\¶KHZDVWROGWKDWWKHUHKDGEHHQEDGUHSRUWVDQGWKDWQRWHYHQ
Ji could save him if he did not clear his name.89 He wrote an evocative letter to a British 
business contact describing the atmosphere:   
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... I feel at times that some institution should pay me for the sleepless nights and the 
hours of discussions in smoky, drafty [sic.] rooms requiring at all times nerve-mind 
balancing feats to be able come out still as a Chinese befitting their conception of a 
&KLQHVHDQG\HWIDLUWRIRUHLJQHUVZLWKRXWDSSHDULQJDWDQ\WLPHDµUXQQLQJGRJ¶RI
imperialists and capitalists.90  
 
Archival traces suggest that after this Dzau experienced a period of prolonged rootlessness: 
GDOO\LQJLQWKHFRPSDQ\RIµWKLUGIRUFH¶SROLWLFLDQVDQGµJXHUULOODJHQHUDOV¶RIYDU\LQJ
authenticity in Hong Kong.91 Penniless, he then left for Macao where he worked eighteen-
hour days to earn money to send to his family in China. He wrote of this time:  
 
,VXIIHUHGH[WUHPHGHSUHVVLRQVDOPRVWORVWP\PLQG«)DLWKLQ&KULVW
VZRUGDQGD
resolve to work to the brink of exhaustion, forgetting losses of the past, praying that 
0DLDQGWKHFKLOGUHQEHJUDQWHGH[LW«ZDVP\RQO\UHPDLQLQJVWUHQJWK 
   
Several years later, Dzau was helped by former classmates to set up a private academy, where 
he was joined by his wife and grandchild.92 Although his story is atypical, because of his 
background and connections, it remains illustrative of the plight of those who did not fit into 
the new political and social order. As revolutionary nationalism intensified, people like Dzau, 
living in the intermediate Sino-foreign zones, proved to be neither Chinese enough to stay 
and adapt, nor foreign enough to have an obvious exit route.  
 
CONCLUSION 
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There is much to be gained from exploring the elimination of the British presence in China 
with reference to literature on decolonisation and in its international context. While there are 
many obvious differences between China and the countries to which models are most often 
applied, it is also apparent that China shared many experiences, including: having to explore 
pragmatic ways to shape the national economy after the withdrawal of previously dominant 
foreign businesses; eliminating the cultural legacies of imperialism; and dealing with its 
human legacies, the compromiseGµERXUJHRLVHOLWHV¶.  
 
Perhaps one of the most important lessons to be drawn from such comparisons is that 
although China went through enormous changes after 1949, they were not necessarily 
changes that were particular to it. Across the world, states had to find ways to reconstruct or 
to build something new: the decolonising states of Southeast Asia struggled to reorient their 
economies and to free them from colonial networks; the New Democracies of Eastern Europe 
turned to the Soviet model to build their socialist economies. One way of conceptualising 
decolonisation is that the withdrawal (sometimes partial) of colonizers created vacuums in 
different spheres that needed to be filled. The CCP took different approaches to different 
aspects of foreign influence: their economic policy was largely aimed at preventing the 
creation of such a vacuum through prolonging the departure of foreign companies, but in the 
cultural sphere, they created a sharp GLFKRWRP\EHWZHHQµROG¶, imperialist Shanghai and 
µQHZ¶, socialist Shanghai. Foreign µpropaganda¶ could not be tolerated as it offered a 
dissenting voice just as the new regime sought to cement its revolutionary legitimacy. 
Similarly, English-speaking middle and upper class people were quickly ostracized in a 
society defined by class struggle and anti-imperialism.  
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From the British perspective, was it, as Winks suggested, easier to decolonize formal empire 
than informal empire? Britain certainly had less control over the withdrawal here, but the 
stakes also remained considerably lower than in formal empire. Winks posited that the 
decolonisation of informal empire is messier because there is no fresh start. In China the 
Communists certainly wanted to remake society anew, but their efforts to eliminate the 
legacies of the old society were necessarily (and frustratingly) patchy and incomplete in the 
1950s, with decolonisation of different fields taking place at varied speeds. This demonstrates 
that even at the moment that a strong Chinese state was able to begin purging China of 
unwanted Western influences, it still remained difficult to differentiate between what was 
truly µ&KLQHVH¶DQGZKDWZDVµ%ULWLVK¶, µIRUHLJQ¶, 'semi-colonial' RUµLPSHULDOLVW¶.  
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